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The research focuses on the reasons interest groups, corporations, non-profits, or other entities hire lobbying firms 
with specific expertise, party affiliation, specializations, or personal connections to advocate for them before 
Congress. Organized interests get represented in Washington, D.C. by advocacy organizations that speak directly on 
their behalf or by lobbying firms that are hired to advocate for them. There is much scholarly research on advocacy 
organizations, but very little about lobbying firms. This research aims to study the role that these firms play in 
American politics. We investigated several different traits of lobbying firms such as their age, location, firm type, 
and founders’ party affiliation. We analyzed 3,390 firms and collected information from their official websites as 
well as other online sources. We have four sets of preliminary findings: (1) the distribution of yearly revenue for 
firms has remained constant since 2008; (2) law firms generate more lobbying revenue than do lobbying firms; (3) 
the distribution of Democratic partisan founders is similar among both law firms and lobbying firms; and (4) firms 
with more lobbyists are inclined to have higher revenue per lobbyist than smaller firms. The next steps for this 
research are to examine the impact of political considerations on interest groups’ decisions to hire specific lobbyists 
and to investigate how changes in political conditions affect these decisions. Further, we plan to conduct social 
network analysis linking interest groups to lobbying firms and, ultimately, individual lobbyists through relationships 
to specific legislators and committees. 
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Studying the firm's partisanship revealed that the distribution of Democratic partisan 
founders is similar among both law and lobbying firms. While law firms' founders tend 
to lean slightly Democratic, the founders of lobbying firms lean slightly Republican. 
This difference is small but statistically significant (P= 0.001). This pattern may exist 
because law firms are generally older than lobbying firms and thus their founders’ party 
does not influence the firm’s partisanship. In contrast, partisanship may be more 
central to the identities of lobbying firms because they tend to be younger (and, thus, 
founded during a period of Republican dominance). The mean law firm is about 73 
years old while the mean lobbying firm is around 22 years old. The difference 
between these values is quite large and statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). 
Data Collection
Association Between Number of Lobbyists and 
Revenue Per Lobbyist
The distribution of yearly revenue for firms has remained constant since 
2008. The modal firm earns around $100,000 annually. The graph 
skews right, though it is rare for firms to have revenues that exceed 
$100,000,000. The number of firms earning $10,000 and $100,000 
was greater in 2009 than in all other years. The median and the mean of 
the graph fluctuate and are not synchronized. For example, in 2011 the 
median was $165,700 and in 2012, it rose to $166,200. In the same 
time period, the mean dropped from $810,000 to $786,500. In 2012, 
the third quartile also dropped along with the maximum total revenue.
The next steps for this research are to examine the impact of political considerations on 
interest groups’ decisions to hire specific lobbyists and to investigate how changes in 
political conditions affect these decisions. Further, we plan to conduct social 
network analysis linking interest groups to lobbying firms and, ultimately, individual 
lobbyists through relationships to specific legislators and committees. By studying the 
process it takes to get one’s position represented before Congress, we aim to 
investigate the representational inequality that we believe exists in the lobbying 
process. 
There is greater variation in the median quarterly revenue generated by law firms 
than the revenue generated by lobbying firms. The amount of quarterly revenue 
generated by both types of firms is not synchronized. Law firms earn more 
lobbying revenue than lobbying firms. While law firms typically earn around 
$350,000 to $780,000 in lobbying revenue, lobbying firms earn around 
$160,000 to $250,000 quarterly. However, the median quarterly revenue per 
lobbyist of law firms is lower than that of lobbying firms. Law firms average 
$50,000 per lobbyist per quarter, while lobbying firms average $56,000. This 
difference is quite statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). This disparity could 
be caused by fact that law firms typically tend to be larger than lobbying firms. The 
largest lobbying firm we researched had 99 lobbyists whereas the largest lobbying 
firm had only 48. Law firms employ a mean of around six registered lobbyists 
while lobbying firms have a mean of three lobbyists. 
Firms with more lobbyists are inclined to have higher revenue per lobbyist than 
smaller firms. However, the revenue increases marginally for every lobbyist after 
the tenth one. Most firms have one lobbyist and earn around $50,000 to 
$500,000 in revenue per lobbyist. The vast majority of firms have fewer than 
ten lobbyists. Very few firms have more than 100 lobbyists likely due to the 
diminishing returns from hiring additional lobbyists.
Median Quarterly Revenue Among Firms
Distribution of Firms with Partisan Founders
Distribution of Yearly Revenue
Next Steps
The First Amendment of the Constitution protects 
Americans’ rights to petition the government to address 
their concerns. Organized interests get represented in 
Washington, D.C. by advocacy organizations that speak 
directly on their behalf or by lobbying firms that are hired 
to advocate for them. Lobbyists with political connections or 
specific party allegiances are hired by clients to influence  
 public policy. There is much scholarly research on advocacy       
     organizations, but very little about lobbying firms or 
lobbyists themselves. 
The purpose of this research is to study how lobbying firms differ from 
each other and how they behave as firms. We aim to investigate how 
clients and firms react to a change in political conditions. The project 
examines firms’ specialization and whether or not that has an impact on 
who hires them.  For example, do certain clients prefer hiring firms with 
a policy expertise while others prefer ones that are more access 
oriented?  Our findings will reveal how a change in the political party in 
power influences the hiring decisions of firms, interest groups, and other 
entities, as well as the influence of political calculations on lobbying.
We collected information from the data revealed through the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act, which was provided by the Sunlight Foundation. We limited our population 
to firms which filed more than two non-zero quarterly lobbying activity reports. 
We analyzed 3,400 firms and collected information from their official websites 
(when available) as well as other online sources.  We also used the LinkedIn 
pages of the firms’ founders and campaign contributions to determine the 
founder’s political affiliation if the information was not available on their website. 
We used Lobbyist Bio Finder to access all firms' websites and collect each 
individual lobbyist’s biography. Ultimately, information we obtained by tagging of 
websites Lobbyist Bio Finder, will be used to gather detailed biographical data 
about lobbyists employed by these firms.
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